State Anti-Kickback Statutes: Where the Action is by Leaman, Kathryn
Health Law and Policy Brief
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 4
12-6-2013
State Anti-Kickback Statutes: Where the Action is
Kathryn Leaman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hlp
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Health Law and Policy Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leaman, Kathryn. "State Anti-Kickback Statutes: Where the Action is." Health Law & Policy Brief 2, no. 2 (2008): 22-27.
I. Introduction
A low-income, pregnant, drug addicted woman
walks into her local health and rehabilitative services
department seeking help. The counselor threatens the
vulnerable woman that the state will take away her
baby unless the woman enrolls in a specific
drug treatment center. The frightened
woman enrolls in the specific
treatment center. but behind the
scenes, the counselor receives
S"kick k" from the
drug treatment center
in the form of $250 for
each woman referred.
In order to prevent
may skews protessionlal
medical judgment to
the detriment of patients,
Congress, in 1972. passed
the Federal Anti-kickback
Statute and has since broadened
the scope and increased the criminal
liahility for actions violating the statute."
Folloswing the federal gosvemnent's lead. most states
enacted their ossn Anti-kickback Statutes. States
enacted these statutes to protect patients from medical
retferrals based upon the health care prosvider's finan~cial
incentiv es, rather than medical necessity. Recently, in
Stare v. Uarden,4 the Florida Supreme Court declared
the state's anti-kickback statute unconstitutional under
the Supiemacy Clause because it imposed criminal
liability swheie the IFedeial Anti-kickback Statute
did not." This article esvaluates sexveral state Anti-
kickback Statutes, using Harden to deteimine svhether
constitutional challenges vsould be successful against
other state statutes. Part 11 provides a oeneral oxvemview
of the federal and state anti-kickback statute and an
analy sis of Harden. Part IlI assesses swhether other
state statutes could be declared unconstitutional using
Harden's reasoning and provides recommendations on
how states could amend their anti-kickback statutes to
circumvent constitutional challenges.
II. Overview
IThis section provides a brief history of the Federal
Anti-kickback Statue and compares various state anti-
kickback statutes.
A. The Federal Anti-kickhack Statute
In 1972, Congress passed the original Federal
Anti-kickback Statute, which prohibited payment
of kickbacks, bribes, or rebates for the referral of
Medicaid or Medicare patients.' Congress declared
that any conduct violating the statute would result
in a criminal misdemeanor punishable by fines of
up to $10,000 and/or one year in prison Confusion
over what constituted a "bribe" or a "kickback"
arose in the courts.' In response, Congress amended
the Anti-kickback Statute in 1977, declaring that
any remuneration offered. solicited, or received in
exchange for Medicare or Medicaid referrals violated
the Statute and constituted a felony.1 Congress again
amended the Anti-kickback Statute in 1980 to provide
the requisite mens rea of "knowingly and willfully" to
justify the heightened fines.0
Once the violation became a federal felony, health care
providers lobbied Congress to provide greater clarity
on what ty pes of referrals, remunerations, or offers
are prohibited by the statute. As a result, in 1987,
Congress once again amended the Anti-kickback
Statute providing the Office of Inspector General of
the Department of Health and luman Services (01iG),
along with the Department of Justice, authority to
punish individuals who violated the Anti-kickback
Statute. This amendment also imposed a duts on the
01G to establish "safe harbors," which would provide
guidance and protection to individuals engaged in
the health care business.> Congress continued to
tinker svith the Anti-kickback Statute by broadening
the scope of the statute to cosver all federal health
programs, except the Federal FEmploy ee Benefit Health
Program (FFBHPl), inmposmng more duties on the OIG.
such as the requirement to issue adv isory opinions, and
by drafting more sate harbors. " Cuiiently, the IFederal
\nti-kickback Statute provides that any person swho:
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I[Klnowingly and willfully offers or pays any
remuneration (including any kick-back, bribe, or
rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind to any person to induce such person
[ for referrals or] . . . to purchase, lease. order, or
arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or
ordering any good., facility. service, or item for
which payment may be made ... under a [f]ederal
health care program.14
The statute contains many exceptions, including but
not limited to: (1) properly disclosed discounts; (2) a
bona fide employee-employer relationship; (3) specific
waivers of co-insurances; (4) specific arrangements
between vendors and vendees; (5) certain managed care
arrangements; and (6) any other arrangements exempted
in the regulations.1 Thus, it remains to be seen how
Congress might tweak the Anti-kickback Statute in the
future to protect patients covered by federal health care
programs and the Federal Fisc from fraud, abuse, and
waste.
B. State Anti-kickback Statutes
Out of the seven states surveyed, their anti-kickback
statutes appear to fall into three categories. Ihe first
group follows the language of the Federal Anti-
kickback Statute, while some also include state statutory
exceptions.i6 The second group of states provides that
a person in violation of the statute would be guilty of
a misdemeanor, unless certain elements are present, in
which case the conduct will constitute a felony." The
final group of state anti-kickback statutes provides no
intent standard and no exceptions, yet still classifies the
violation as a felony.Is
i. State Anti-kickback Statutes that
Mirror the Federal Anti-kickback Statute
and Provide Statutory Exceptions
Three of seven states surveyed mirror the Federal Anti-
kickback Statute in their own unique way and provide
statutory exceptions very similar to the Federal Anti-
kickback safe harbors. Of these three, Nc Mexico's
Anti-kickback Statute differs from the Federal Anti-
kickback Statute the mostL prosviding that any person
wxho knoxxingly solicits. receixves, offers, or pay s
icmuncration dircctlx, indirectly. oveitly. cosvertly, in
return for referrals or puichasing, leasing. ordering
or arranging goods, tacilities, or services tor which
pay meat is made in xxhole or in part wsith public money
shall be guilty of a felony." The state statute does not
apply to properly disclosed discounts or to a bona fide
employee- employer relationship.)0
Virginia's Anti-kickback Statute conforms more closely
to the Federal Anti-kickback Statute. The Virginia
Anti-kickback Statute provides that any person who
knowingly and willfully solicits, receives, oflers, or pays
remuneration directly, indirectly, overtly, or covertly for
a referral under medical assistance or to purchase, lease,
order, or arrange for any goods, facilities, or services
"for which payment may be made in whole or part under
medical assistance" shall be guilty of a felony. The
statute does not apply to properly disclosed discounts,
bona fide employee-employer relationships, authorized
group purchases, or any business arrangement allowed
under the Federal Anti-kickback Statute.
Minnesota's Anti-kickback Statute takes a more direct
approach in demonstrating its confonnity with the
Federal Anti-kickback Statute by providing that the
Commissioner of IHIealth shall adopt rules restricting
financial relationships within the health care industry.23
Interestingly, however, the rules must be "compatible
with, and no less restrictive than" the Federal Anti-
kickback Statute, except that the rules may apply
to "additional provider groups and businesses and
professional arrangements."24 Furthermore, until the
Commissioner adopts such rules, the Federal Anti-
kickback Statute shall apply to "all persons in the state,
regardless of whether the person participates in any state
health program."25 The Statute also exempts properly
disclosed discounts or remunerations for continued
product use so long as certain elements are met.26
ii. State Anti-kckback Statutes that have
Misdemeanor and Felony Classifications
Three of the seven states surveyed provide that a
violation of their anti-kickback statute constitutes a
misdemeanor, unless the value of the remuneration in
question exceeds a certain amount, or if certain elements
are met. If not, the violation constitutes a felony. Ohio's
Anti-kickback Statute provides that it is fraudulent to
solicit, offer, or receive any remuneration in connection
with goods or services Ifor which payment may be made
in whole or part under the medical assistance program.27
Ohio's intent standard requires either "with the purpose
to commit fraud oi knowing that the person is facilitating
a fraud."2 \While Ohio's statute does not provide any
exceptions, if the xvalue of property. senvices, or funds
obtained is under $500. the siolation is a misdemeanor.
Otherxxise, the siolation is a felony)9
The Newv York Anti-kickback Statute raises the
punishment lesvel from misdemeanor to felony at the
threshold value of $7,500.3( The statute criminalizes
any "medical assistance prosvider" xwho accepts,
offers, reeceixves, or solicits any pay ment or any other
consideration for referrals or "to purchase, lease, or
order any goods, facilities, or services which payment is
made" by the State.32 While the New York Statute does
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not contain a knowing or willful intent requirement,
it specitically declares that it shall not apply to any
activity exempted by either the Federal Anti-kickback
Statute or regulations.34
While Texas' Anti-kickback Statute differentiates
between a misdemeanor and a felony violation, it
does not take into account the value of remuneration
obtained>. Instead, a person can be convicted of a
felony for violating Texas' anti-kickback statute only if
the person has previously been convicted of an offense
or if he or she was an employee of the federal, state,
or local government at the time that the offense was
committed." To violate the Texas Statute, one must
"knowingly offer to pay or agree to accept, directly,
indirectly, overtly, or covertly, any remuneration for
securing or soliciting a patient or patronage for or from
a person licensed, certified, or registered" by Iexas'
health care regulatory agency.37
ii. Pennsylvania's Anti-kic ack atute,
Contains No Intent Requirement, but a
Violation Constitutes a Felony
Pennsylvania's Anti-kickback Statute stands alone
because it does not include an intent standard, nor
does it provide for any exceptions. Nonetheless, it
still characterizes any violation as a felony. I he
statute provides that it shall be unlawful for anyone to
offer, receive, or solicit any remuneration, directly or
indirectly, to any person for referrals or "in connection
with the furnishing of services or merchandise for
which payment may be in whole or in part under the
medical assistance program."
C. State v. Harden
The Florida Anti-kickback Statute provides that it is
unlawful to knowingly offer, pay. receive, or solicit
any remuneration directly or indirectly, overtly
or covertly. for referrals or for leasing, obtaining,
ordering, or purchasing any goods, items, facilities, or
services for which payment may be made in whole or
in part under Medicaid-40 In Harden, the state alleged
that ten individuals etther associated with or etnploy ed
by Dental Fxpress Dentists engaged tn a "pay tor
patients" scheme xwhere these indiv iduals received "per
head" pay ments in exchange tor soliciting and drtxving
Medicaid-eligible childien to 1)ental E'xpress for dental
treatment.41 The state argued this "scheme" violated
Florida's statute because the defendants receixved
money in exchange for ro'tnding up children from poor
neighborhoods and takino them to their employer for
dental serxvices and, in turn, billing Florida's Medicaid
Program for the services rendered.42) The defense
argued that such an arrangement was protected by the
Federal Employee Safe Ilarbor.43 Ihe defense further
argued that since the Florida Statute criminalized
behavior the Federal Anti-kickback Statute allowed, it
was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.44
Federal law may preempt state law under express
preemption, implied field preemption, or implied
conflict preemption. 45 Ixpress preemption is when
the federal statute explicitly states that it preempts
state statutes; (2) implied field preemption is when
the "scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the states to supplement it;" and (3) implied
conflict preemption is when it is physically impossible
to comply with both federal and state law or when the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."46 In dealing with the explicit preemption
theory, the Florida Supreme Court looked to both the
Fe'ederal-Anti-kickback Statute and the GIG, determining
that there was no explicit preemption provision within
the Statute. 47 lloWever, the court believed that this
fact alone did not bar the preemption claim because
the Florida Statute could still be preempted under the
theory of implied conflict preemption.48
The court held that Florida's Statute failed under the
implied conflict preemption theorx for two reasons:
(1) the Florida statute contained a lower intent
requirement, which permitted a violation based on
negligent behavior:49 and (2) the Florida statute did
not contain safe harbors or exceptions.N In addressing
the intent requirement, the court looked to Congress'
intent for increasing the mens rea, and found that
Congress did not want to impose criminal liability
on individuals whose conduct, while improper, was
ultimately inadvertent.5 Ihus, Congress intended
that only those individuals who acted "knowingly
or willfully" should be criminally liable under the
Fe'ederal Anti-kickback Statute, while Florida's Statute
criminalizes individuals who knew or should have
known their conduct was unlawful.5
In addition, Congress explicitly stated that any
compensatoion receixved in an employece-employ er
ielationship xxould be exempt fronm criminal liability
undler the F ederal Anti-kickback Statute. thus
exempting the compensation the detendants received
from their employ er in return for transporting
Medicaid-eligible children to receixve dental seirvices
from their emploxyem. N Congress clearly intended to
exempt this ty pe of employee- employ er compensation
arrangement from criminal liability and only wxantcd
to eriminalize individuals xxith a heightened mens
rea. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court found that the
state's Anti-kickback Statute presented an obstacle to
the accomplishments and purposes of Congress and of
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the Federal Anti-kickback Statute.4 Consequently, the court held that the
-Florida Statute was preempted by the Federal Anti-kickback Statute via the
Supremacy Clause.
III. Discussi on
While it is unclear whether the Florida Supreme Court would have declared
the Florida Anti-kickback Statute preempted if the intent requirement
was heightened or if the statute contained exceptions, Harden provides
an analytical framework under which to evahbate other state anti-
kickback statutes' constitutionality.16 Harden also demonstrates ways
state legislatures can amend their anti-kickback statutes in order to avoid
successful preemption challenges.
A. State Anti-kickback Statutes that Expressly Exempt any
Allowable Arrangement Under the Federal Anti-kickback
Statue Should Not be Preempted
The Florida Supreme Court's primary problem with the state statute was
that it posed an obstacle to the objectives and purposes of the Federal Anti-
kickback Statute." Applying this reasoning to the laws in Minnesota, New
York, and Virginia, it appears unlikely that a court would find that these
statutes frustrate the objectives and purposes of the Federal Aniti-kickback
Statute primarily because the state statutes explicitly exempt any conduct
from criminal liability that the Federal Anti-kickback Statute allows. 9
Given this interpretation, anti-kickback statutes in these three states would
likely survive a preemption challenge under the Supremacy Clause.
B. It is Unclear Whether State Anti-kickback Statutes
Which Have Either Some Exceptions or Classifies a
Violation a Misdemeanor Rather Than a Felony Will
be Preempted
The two elements that the Florida Supreme Court relied on to declare the
-Florida Statute unconstitutional were that: (1) the state statute provided
a lower intent standard of "knowingly" as compared to the Federal Anti-
kickback Statute's intent standard ot "knowingly and willfully; and (2)
the state statute did not provide for any exceptions similar to the safe
harbor found in both the Federal Anti-kickback Statute and regulations. 60it
remains unclear whether the court would have reached the same conclusion
had only one of the two elements mentioned above been present.
For example, New Mexico's statute provides a lower intent standard of
"knowingly" as compared to the Federal Anti-kickback Statue's intent
standard of "know ingly and xwillfully."' The state statute includes txxo
exceptions found in the Federal Anti-kickback Statute, namely: the
discount and bona fide emploxymeat exceptions, but fails to incorporate the
remnainin exceptions currently found in the Federal Anti-kickback Statute
and regulations.62 While Nexx Mexico's statute appears to be heifer suited
to defend a preemption challenge than Florida's statute, a court xxould
likely find the New Mexico statute preempted because. (1) it proxvides a
loxxer intent requirement than the Federal Anti-kickback Statute. (2) it only
povxides twou statutory exemptionis cIompared to the numerous federal safe
harbois; and (3) the state statute pioxides that anxone tound in violation
with the law shall be guilty of a felony.63
While New Mexico's regulations incorporate any conduct that violates
federal law into its definition of "provider misconduct," it does not provide
for any other exceptions found in the federal regulatory scheme, and
therefore frustrates the Federal Anti-kickback's purpose by criminalizing
behavior specifically exempted by the federal government.64 The analysis
becomes more interesting when the state anti-kickback statute provides that
anyone violating the law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. rather than a
felony. For example. Ohio's statute provides an arguably more stringent
intent requirement than the Federal Anti-kickback's "knowingly and
willfully" by requiring a person to act "with the purpose to commit fraud
or knowing that the person is facilitating fraud."6 1 In addition to the higher
intent requirement, a violation of the Ohio statute equates to a misdemeanor,
rather than a felony (unless the value of the property obtained is more than
$500,, which in that case would constitute a felony).\6 While Ohio does
not include any exceptions, a court may be persuaded that the state statute
does not frustrate the objectives or purposes of the F ederal Anti-kickback
Statute because: (1) fewer individuals would be found in violation of the
law due to the higher intent requirement; and (2) even if the prosecution is
able to prove the higher intent requirement, the person is guilty of only a
misdemeanor unless the prosecution can prove that remuneration over $500
was actually obtained, rather than just offered, solicited, or agreed upon.6]
Texas' statute falls somewhere in between., because it provides a lower
"knowingly" intent requirement than the Federal Anti-kickback Statute's
"knowingly and willfully" standard.' The state statute also provides
no exceptions and only classifies a violation as a misdemeanor (unless
previously convicted under
the statute or the individual
was a government employee
at the time of the violation
then it is a felony), as
opposed to the federal law's
felony classification.60
Texas' regulations provide
an exception foi a "referral





plan for necessary medical
services."0 'Arguably, the
Texas Statute does not
frustrate the objectives
oi puipose of the Iedeial
Statute because it piosvides
a lowser intent requiiemnent
for a lowvei classitication of
punlishment anld prosvides
at least one exception
to common health care
business practicesn None-
theless, the statute still
prohibits other common
health care business ht
arrangements or conduct,
such as a bona fide lease of
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office space or medical equipment, which the Federal Anti-kickback Statute
sanctions.7 A court would be hard pressed to find two individuals guilty of
a misdemeanor for "knowingly" offering and receiving remuneration in the
form of a fair market value lease arrangement in exchange for reasonable
space or equipment provides. This is how the U.S. economy operates.
One must consider, however, whether this reasoning will be sufficient to
appease the GIG.
In order to remedy the possibility of a successful preemption challenge,
New Mexico, Ohio, and T exas should amend their statutes with a catch-
all provision., providing that these statutes do not apply to any conduct
sanctioned by the Federal Anti-kickback Statute or regulations adopted
thereafter. These states will still be able to maintain their autonomy
and uniqueness in combating health care fraud, waste, and abuse, while
complying with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
C. A Court will Likely Find the Federal Anti-kickback
Statute Preempts -Pensylvania's Anti-kickback Statute
U nder Harden
inder Harden, the Federal Anti-kickback Statute appears to preempt
Pennsylvania's statute because the state statute seems to be more of an
obstacle to the objectives and purposes of the federal statute than the
Florida Anti-kickback Statute. 3 Pennsylvania's anti-kickback statute does
not provide any intent requirement for a violation classified as a felony.7
[Moreover, the Pennsylvania Statute fails to provide for any exceptions for
normal health care business practices that the Federal Anti-kickback Statute
exempts. HI lowever, Pennsylvania's regulations provide two exceptions,
namely a bona fide oflfice space lease exception76 and a properly disclosed
discount exception.77 While the regulatory exceptions help strengthen the
argument against preemption of the Pennsylvania Statute, the lack an intent
requirement along with any bona fide employment exception frustrates
the purpose of the Federal Anti-kickback Statute. Thus, if the Florida's
statute fails under the Supremacy Clause because it provides a lower intent
requirement and fails to grant exceptions, then the Pennsylvania Statute
will fail as well. Pennsylvania provides no intent requirement and only
two regulatory exceptions, as compared to the numerous federal regulatory
exceptions In order to remedy this defect, the Pennsylvnina legislature
should add a provision stating that this statute does not apply to any
conduct sanctioned by the Federal Anti-kickback Statute or any regulations
promulgated under it.
The F1ederal and state anti-kickback statutes play a valuable and necessar
iole in combating fraud, xwaste, and abuse in the health care industry. AVs
Congress realized, rhese statutes must he namrrowxed in ordem to allowx normal
and necessary business tiansactions to occur xwithout fear of criminal
liabilitx. WXithout such exceptions. the health care industrx xxould cease to
exist, wxhich wxould dev astate not only our economy but also jeopardize
the xxell-being of all U.S., citizens. Consequently. state legislators must
reexvaluate their anti-kickback statutes and ensure that dhey do not frustrate
the objectixves of the Federal Anti-kickback Statute. If the state finds that its
anti-kickback statute may pose a problem, the state legislature should add
a provision exempting all conduct sanctioned by the Federal Anti-kickback
Statute and regulations adopted thereunder.
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